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The Picture Begins to Assert Itself:  
Rules of Construction for Essential Health Benefits 
in Health Insurance Plans Subject to  
the Affordable Care Act 
Wendy K. Mariner * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Joan Miró described his artistic method as moving from free expression 
to more detailed execution: “I begin painting and as I paint, the picture 
begins to assert itself. . .  The first stage is free, unconscious. The second 
stage is carefully calculated.”
1
 Like Miró, the drafters of the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”)
2
 might resist being labeled Surrealists, but the product 
of their efforts is a large canvas on which a new picture of health insurance 
is emerging. In broad strokes, the ACA lays out a vision for financing 
access to comprehensive, affordable health care, thus changing the nature of 
health insurance. No longer the subject of an ordinary, voluntary 
commercial transaction – because almost everyone must obtain some form 




* Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University School of Public Health, 
Professor of Law, School of Law, Professor of Socio-Medical Sciences, School of Medicine. 
My thanks to Professors George J. Annas, Leonard H. Glantz, and Jeffrey W. Stempel, and 
Michael E. Cannella, Health Law & Bioethics Fellow, BU School of Public Health, for 
insightful comments and suggestions. Errors remain my own. 
1.  Susie Hodge, Why Your Five-Year-Old Could Not Have Done That: Modern Art 
Explained 63 (2012) (quoting Miró). My thanks to Professors Stempel and Annas for 
inspiring this metaphor. 
2.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
3.  See Paul Starr, Remedy and Reaction: The Peculiar American Struggle Over Health 
Care Reform 241 (2011) (“The Affordable Care Act restructures health insurance so as to 
achieve for all Americans the aims it has been serving only for some—to provide access to 
health care and protection against the risk of being bankrupted by medical costs.”); Wendy 
K. Mariner, Health Insurance Is Dead; Long Live Health Insurance, 40 Am. J.L. & Med. 
195, 201 (2014) [hereinafter Mariner, Long Live Health Insurance] (“[T]he ACA cemented a 
broader social function for health insurance, employing it to serve the goal of access to 
affordable healthcare for all.”). The ACA’s future depends on somewhat unpredictable 
political support for some of its elements. See David Nather, Health Care Torch Passed . . . 
to Nobody, Politico (Dec. 7, 2014, 8:29 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/health-
care-democrats-113379.html. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2638401 
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While private, commercial insurance remains a critical element of this 
system, it is now subject to extensive regulations intended to achieve the 
ACA’s dual goals of comprehensive coverage and affordability.
4
 Health 
insurers who sell policies in the individual and small group markets, 
including through health insurance exchanges or marketplaces, must 
comply with ACA requirements for issuance, renewal, coverage, and 
actuarial value for a significant segment of the health insurance market.
5
 
This shift in the nature of health insurance creates some challenges for 
the law governing the interpretation of health insurance policies. Insurance 
policies are typically viewed as a specific category of contract, such that 
traditional rules of contract construction apply to ascertain the meaning of 
an insurance policy.
6
 A substantial body of scholarship has refined these 
rules to fit the particular quirks of insurance, especially covered benefits 
and exclusions in standard form insurance policies.
7
 Yet, considerable 
debate remains over which rules are justified and which should apply in 
which circumstances.
8
 Many rules of construction do not seamlessly fit 
health insurance policies.
9
 Health insurance itself has long been a bit of an 
 
4.  See Starr, supra note 3 (The ACA “seeks the more limited goal of making health care 
and health insurance ‘affordable.’”). Health insurance, whether public or private, finances 
most health care services in the United States. National Health Expenditures by Type of 
Service and Source of Funds, Calendar Years 1960-2013, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html (follow the 
hyperlink labeled “National Health Expenditures by type of service and source of funds, CY 
1960-2013”) (last modified Dec. 9, 2014, 6:26 AM). 
5.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-1 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, 
excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (guaranteed issuance of insurance); § 
300gg-11 (no lifetime or annual limits); § 300gg-14 (extension of dependent coverage); see 
also 45 C.F.R. Pt. 153 (2014) (provisions for risk adjustments, risk corridors, and 
reinsurance); Pt. 156 (requirements for offering qualified health plans on exchanges); Pt. 158 
(medical loss ratio requirements). 
6.  Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653, 657-
58 (2013) [hereinafter Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance]. See generally Susan 
Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 107, 107-35 (2008). 
7.  See Robert H. Jerry, II & Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law 125-
64 (5th ed. 2012); see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, 
And Public Policy 118-119, 175-87 (1986) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK] 
(discussing reformation of contracts, breaches of contract, and measures of damages). See 
generally Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 Mich. L. 
Rev. 531 (1996) [hereinafter Abraham, Policy Interpretation]; James M. Fischer, Why Are 
Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 
Ariz. St. L.J. 995 (1992); Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A 
Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 471 (1961). 
8.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel et al., Principles of Insurance Law 103-38 (4th ed. 2012) 
(discussing the legal system and methods by which it assesses insurance policies and 
determines coverage). 
9.  See infra Parts IV-V. 
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anomaly in the insurance field.
10
 The history of health insurance includes 
examples of courts struggling with whether to classify health plans as 
service contracts or as insurance for purposes of state insurance 
regulation.
11
 With health insurance operating as a federally regulated 
industry to finance health care, rather than offering only voluntary contracts 
to accept certain risks, conventional rules of construction have diminishing 
relevance. The question of how to interpret coverage governed by the ACA 
becomes more acute as federal and state governments implement the new 
regulatory scheme.
12
 The challenge is to move from the broad strokes of 
the ACA canvas to more deliberate details. 
This article attempts to take a first step in that direction, without – it 
must be said – completing the picture. The article explores which rules of 
interpretation should apply to one specific line of insurance – health 
insurance policies, primarily qualified health plans, sold to individuals and 
small groups through the exchanges and private markets governed by the 
ACA.
13
 The ACA requires such plans to cover Essential Health 
Benefits,
14
 described in Part II, but both the statute and the regulations 
speak in broad categorical terms, leaving considerable discretion to insurers 
to decide what to cover in particular health plans and in individual cases. 
This raises the question of which rule – or rules – of construction should be 
used to make coverage decisions and resolve coverage disputes. 
Two possibilities are explored here. First, the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations, described in Part III, holds some promise. Part IV examines 
whether that doctrine is suited to making ex post decisions about what 
health care is covered within the meaning of Essential Health Benefits 
 
10.  See Wendy K. Mariner, Health Reform: What’s Insurance Got to Do With It? 
Recognizing Health Insurance as a Separate Species of Insurance, 36 Am. J.L. & Med. 436, 
438 (2010) [hereinafter Mariner, What’s Insurance Got to Do With It?] (describing ways in 
which health insurance differs from conventional insurance). 
11.  See, e.g., id. at 444 (describing health insurance as including elements of both 
conventional insurance and service contracts); Jordan v. Group Health Ass’n., 107 F.2d 239 
(D.C. Cir. 1939). See also Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that in “the health 
care arena, the line between an ordinary service contract and an insurance contract is more 
elusive.”). 
12.  See Mariner, Long Live Health Insurance, supra note 3, at 214 (concluding, “[T]he 
ACA has taken the first step in the process to provide general standards for health insurance 
coverage. The next step is to reevaluate the normative standards in insurance law that govern 
what insurers must do for insureds at the level of patient care.”). 
13.  The article does not address state Medicaid expansion programs, including those 
permitted pursuant to a waiver under Social Security Act § 1115, that are allowed to 
establish benchmark equivalent coverage, which is similar to Essential Health Benefits. See 
42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(2). 
14.  42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(b) (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 
113-235, 113-287, and 113-291); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-6(b) (West, WestlawNext through 
P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291). 
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governed by the ACA. Since Essential Health Benefits are a statutory 
requirement, Part V considers the need for rules of statutory interpretation. 
These could compensate for a disadvantage of the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations – the likely absence of specific expectations by the parties. The 
article concludes that courts, insurers, and policyholders would be well 
served by adopting a functional combination of both approaches, which 
might be called reasonable statutory expectations, to carry out the 
regulatory and financing functions of ACA plans. As noted in Part VI, this 
is a modest conclusion, given the circumscribed scope of private health 
plans currently subject to ACA requirements. It adds only slightly more 
definition to the picture. Nonetheless, such a functional approach to 
interpreting ACA plans could play a positive role and inform a growing 
number of health plans. 
II. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS 
The goal of the Affordable Care Act is to increase access to health care 
by enabling individuals and small groups to purchase affordable health 
insurance in the private market, including through web-based marketplaces 
(called Exchanges in the Act).
15
 This goal is bolstered in part by the 
individual mandate, and tax credits and subsidies to enable low-income 
individuals to purchase insurance.
16
 To ensure the availability of 
insurance, the Act requires private health insurers that offer qualified health 
plans to individuals or small groups through a marketplace exchange or in 




15.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (“The Act aims 
to increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decrease the cost of 
health care.”); see 26 C.F.R. § 1.5000A-2 (2014) (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9, 2015; 
80 Fed. Reg. 19,036) (explaining minimum essential coverage). 
16.  See 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 111-148, 111-152, 
111-159, and 111-173); see also 26 C.F.R. §1.5000A-2 (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9, 
2015; 80 Fed. Reg. 19,036); 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, 
excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (discussing premium assistance tax credits). 
The majority of those who purchased coverage through an exchange are eligible for 
subsidies currently, since the IRS interpreted §§ 1311 and 1321 of the ACA to permit 
subsidies to those who purchased through the federal website. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2 
(West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9, 2014; 80 Fed. Reg. 19,036) (detailing a taxpayer’s 
eligibility for premium assistance). 
17. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18021 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 
113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (defining qualified health plans); § 18022 (defining 
qualified health plans); §18022 (outlining the essential health benefit requirements). The 
number of grandfathered plans has been declining. Sarah Barr, FAQ: Grandfathered Health 
Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 13, 2013), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/ 
grandfathered-plans-faq/. Consequently, most grandfathered plans will ultimately be 
replaced by self-insured plans or plans that must meet ACA requirements. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 18031, 18041 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-
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include guaranteed issue and prohibitions on exclusions based on pre-
existing conditions and health risks, prohibitions on lifetime and annual 
benefit limits, as well as requirements for plan actuarial values, medical loss 
ratios, risk adjustments, and data reporting.
18
 The exchanges may be 
established or operated by a state, the federal government, or a federal-state 
cooperative arrangement of various types.
19
 This article refers to the ACA 
plans required to meet these conditions as “ACA plans,” whether they are 
offered through an exchange or in the ordinary insurance market. 
To assure consistency in benefit design, the ACA requires ACA plans 
to cover ten categories of health services, called Essential Health Benefits 
(“EHB”).
20
 The Act defines EHB as ten broad categories of benefits: 
(1) Ambulatory patient services; 
(2) Emergency services; 
(3) Hospitalization; 
(4) Maternity and newborn care; 
  (5) Mental health and substance use disorder services, including 
behavioral health treatment; 
(6) Prescription drugs; 
 
287, and 113-291) (establishing the Exchanges and noting that these requirements do not 
apply to large group plans or employer-sponsored self-insured or grandfathered plans). 
18.  45 C.F.R. Pt. 155 (2014) (establishing the exchanges); 45 C.F.R. Pt. 156 (2014) 
(listing the requirements for insurers offering qualified health plans on exchanges); 42 
U.S.C.A § 300gg (prohibiting discriminatory premium rates); § 300gg-1 (requiring health 
insurance issuers to accept every employer and individual that applies for coverage); § 
300gg-3 (prohibiting preexisting condition exclusion); § 300gg-2 (guaranteeing that health 
insurance coverage is renewable); § 300gg-5 (requiring non-discrimination in health care); § 
300gg-11 (prohibiting establishment of annual/lifetime limits on the dollar value of 
benefits); § 300gg-13 (requiring minimum coverage for preventive health services and 
prohibiting cost sharing in various situations); § 300gg-14 (allowing dependent children to 
stay on their parents health plan until 26 years of age); § 300gg-19 (requiring an effective 
internal appeals process); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296, 
excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291) (providing a transitional reinsurance 
program); 42 U.S.C.A. § 18062 (establishing a program of risk corridors); 42 U.S.C.A. § 
18063 (establishing criteria and methods for low and high actuarial risk plans); 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 18071 (implementing income-based cost sharing reductions). ACA plans meeting the 
conditions can be approved as “qualified plans” that can be sold through the marketplace 
exchanges. § 18031(c) (establishing criteria for qualified health plans). 
19.  State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/ (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2015); Sarah J. Dash & Amy Thomas, New State-Based Marketplaces 
Unlikely in 2015, but Technology Challenges Create More Shades of Gray, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND BLOG (May 1, 2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
publications/blog/2014/may/new-state-based-marketplaces-unlikely-in-2015; accord Abbe 
R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of 
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534 (2011) (discussing variations 
in exchanges and Medicaid programs as examples of evolving conceptions of federalism). 
20.  § 18022(b)(1). 
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(7) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; 
(8) Laboratory services; 
  (9) Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management; 
and  
(10) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.
21
 
To complicate matters, the ACA also requires that four general 
“considerations” be taken into account in designing coverage of EHB. First, 
the EHB categories must be balanced, without undue weight given to any 
single category.
22
 Second, coverage must not discriminate on the basis of 
age, disability, or life expectancy.
23
 Third, the needs of diverse groups, 
including women, children, and people with disabilities, should be taken 
into account.
24
 And finally, benefits should not be denied on the basis of 
age, life expectancy, present or predicted disability, degree of medical 
dependency, or quality of life.
25
 
The ACA charged the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”) with the task of defining EHB.
26
 The Secretary, however, 
initially allowed the states to flesh out the actual benefit package for their 
own markets, within some broad parameters.
27
 States could select a 
“benchmark” plan as the template for EHB.
28
 Benchmark plans that did 
not include all ten EHB categories needed to add the missing categories to 
qualify.
29
 This allowed the states and the health insurance industry to use 
existing policies, often with little modification, as benchmarks to meet 
eligibility requirements in the rapid gear-up to the first plan year of the 




21.  Id. The HHS regulations repeat the same unannotated list of benefits. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 156.110 (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 9, 2015; 80 Fed. Reg. 19,036). 
22.  § 18022(b)(4)(A). 
23.  See id. at § 18022(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he Secretary shall. . .not make coverage decisions, 
determine reimbursement rates, establish incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that 
discriminate against individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life.”). 
24.  Id. at § 18022(b)(4)(C). 
25.  Id. at § 18022(b)(4)(D). 
26.  Id. at § 18022(b)(1). 
27.  45 C.F.R. § 156.100 (West, WestlawNext through Apr. 19, 2015; 80 Fed. Reg. 
19,036). See generally Inst. of Med. of the Nat’l Acad., Essential Health Benefits: Balancing 
Coverage and Cost 79-102 (Cheryl Ulmer et al. eds., 2012) (providing recommendations as 
to the process for defining EHB in terms of a typical small employer health insurance plan, 
without specifying content). 
28.  Additional Information on Proposed State Essential Health Benefits Benchmark 
Plans, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/ 
Data-Resources/ehb.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) . 
29.  See id. (“[W]hen designing plans that are substantially equal to the EHB-benchmark 
plan, beginning in 2014, issuers may need to conform plan benefits, including coverage and 
limitations, to comply with [ACA] requirements and limitations.”). 
30.  See id. For a summary of each state’s benchmark plan, see Consumer Information 
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The ostensible purpose of specifying EHB for ACA plans was to offer 
people in the individual and small group market a set of benefits that were 
comparable to the more robust benefits covered by employer-sponsored 
plans,
31
 while maintaining affordable premiums.
32
 However, reliance on 
existing health plans as benchmarks meant that benefits would not 
necessarily be uniform across the states.
33
 Indeed, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that benefits vary somewhat within a single state, since different 
insurance carriers use different definitions of what specific services count as 




and Insurance Oversight, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
http://www.cms.gov/cciio/index.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
31.  § 18022(b)(2) (providing that EHB should be “equal to the scope of benefits 
provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary” without 
distinguishing between plans offered by large and small employers); see INST. OF MED. of the 
Nat’l Acad., supra note 27, at 80-94 (noting that the IOM recommended using small 
employer plans as a benchmark, because individuals and small groups are the market for 
plans offered on an exchange and such plans had lower premiums and actuarial values than 
large employer plans). 
32.  See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH PLAN CHOICE AND PREMIUMS IN 
THE 2015 HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETPLACE 1-3 (2015), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/ 
health/reports/2015/premiumreport/healthpremium2015.pdf (discussing affordable 
premiums). 
33.  See JUSTINE GIOVANNELLI ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: REVISITING THE ACA’S ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS 
REQUIREMENTS 1-2 (2014), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/ 
publications/issue-brief/2014/oct/1783_giovannelli_implementing_aca_essential_hlt_ 
benefits_rb.pdf (discussing how 2014 and 2015 federal regulations did not create “a single, 
nationally uniform package of health services” and how states tailored “benefit standards to 
reflect state priorities”); see also Aimee M. Grace et al., The ACA’s Pediatric Essential 
Health Benefit has Resulted in a State-By-State Patchwork of Coverage with Exclusions, 33 
HEALTH AFF. 2136, 2139-141 (2014) (examining the benchmark plans in all fifty states and 
noting how they differ in relation to pediatric services). 
34.  See Robert Weisman, Demand for Expensive Hepatitis C Drug Strains Insurers, 
BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 2014, http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/05/31/costly-
new-hepatitis-treatments-curing-patients-but-straining-health-care-system-finances/ 
SmBE9NoUESxjfgphfqvXKL/story.html (reporting that Sovaldi, a new drug to treat 
Hepatitis C, is priced incredibly high which significantly increases expenses for insurers who 
cover them; as a result, one insurer in the state of Massachusetts, Neighborhood Health, 
created its own criteria to qualify patients for coverage of the drug and other insurers plan to 
develop a “gated” approach to pay doctors and hospitals); see also Andrew Pollack, 
Lawmakers Attack Cost of New Hepatitis Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/lawmakers-attack-cost-of-new-hepatitis-
drug.html?_r=0 (reporting that with regards to Sovaldi “some insurers say the system cannot 
absorb the $84,000 price for a 12-week course of treatment – or $1,000 a daily pill” and that 
some health plans are limiting treatment to the sickest patients). New drugs to treat the 
Hepatitis C Virus, such as Olysio (simeprevir) and Sovaldi (sofosbuvir), can often cure the 
chronic condition in more patients with certain genotypes in less time and with fewer side 
effects than previously used drugs alone, such as Interferon, Ribavirin, and either Incivek or 
Victrelis. Advances in Medications to Treat Hepatitis C, AM. LIVER FOUND., 
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The ACA requires the Secretary of HHS to develop standards for 
insurers to use in preparing a summary of benefits and coverage.
35
 The 
current standards (or template) focus on costs to the policyholder, including 
premiums, deductibles, co-insurance, co-payments, and out-of-pocket 
limits.
36
 The template lists terms for services in generic language, like 
emergency room services, urgent care, prenatal and postnatal care, 
rehabilitation services, and hospice services.
37
 A glossary presents brief 
definitions of basic terms like balance billing, deductible, and durable 
medical equipment, without identifying specific services.
38
 For example, 
the term “medically necessary” is defined as “health care services or 
supplies needed to prevent, diagnose or treat an illness, injury, condition, 
disease or its symptoms and that meet accepted standards of medicine.”
39
 
Standard terminology should facilitate plan comparisons, so consumers 
should find these definitions helpful.
40
 However, the summaries do not—
and probably cannot—describe precisely what services will be provided to 
 
http://hepc.liverfoundation.org/treatment/the-basics-about-hepatitis-c-treatment/what-
medications-are-used-to-treat-hepatitis-c/ (last updated Apr. 2015). Another example is 
variation in substance abuse treatment. The Massachusetts Association of Health Plans 
(MAHP) noted that commercial health plans cover most of six FDA-approved medications 
to treat opioid addiction, but not Methadone. See Letter from the Mass. Ass’n of Health 
Plans to the Mass. Div. of Ins. (Sept. 26, 2014) (on file with author) (discussing treatment for 
opioid addiction). See also MASS. ASS’N. OF HEALTH PLANS, OPIOID ADDICTION TREATMENT: 
EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, II ON POINT: HEALTH POLICY BRIEF 2-5 
(2015), available at http://www.mahp.com/unify-files/MAHPOnPoint_March2015_ 
Opioid.pdf (arguing that opioid addiction treatment should include a full range of therapies, 
including medication, in addition to more costly inpatient therapy, which is most often 
recommended). 
35.  42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-15 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 113-296, excluding P.L. 113-
235, 113-287, and 113-291) (“[T]he Secretary shall develop standards for use by a group 
health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage, in compiling and providing to applicants, enrollees, and policyholders or 
certificate holders a summary of benefits and coverage explanation that accurately describes 
the benefits and coverage under the applicable plan or coverage” and the explanation is to 
include a description of the coverage for each of the EHB categories, as well as exceptions, 
reductions, and limits on coverage). 
36.  Summary of Benefits and Coverage Template, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. 
1-2, available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-
Resources/Downloads/sbc-template-accessible.pdf. 
37.  Id. at 2-3. 
38.  Glossary of Health Coverage and Medical Terms, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs. 1-2, available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/ 
Downloads/Uniform-Glossary-12-19-14-FINAL.pdf. 
39.  Id. at 3. 
40.  See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of 
Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 394, 423-24 (2014) 
(suggesting that the ACA requirements could be a model for property/casualty and other 
lines of insurance to enable consumers to compare policy terms in a standardized format). 
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anyone in need of future medical care. In any event, the templates are not 
intended to prescribe the particular services that an ACA plan must cover, 
and should not be interpreted as doing so. It is the insurer that chooses the 
services it will cover within EHB categories to comply with ACA 
requirements. 
The variation in EHB will not necessarily be smoothed over in 
subsequent plan years, for at least four reasons. First, there are so many 
different insurers, each with multiple plans, that it is unrealistic to expect 
that they would all define coverage in exactly the same way. Second, it is 
impossible to specify everything that is or should be covered. This is why 
health plans have traditionally listed categories of services, such as inpatient 
hospital services or mental health services, rather than particular drugs, 
diagnostic tests, surgical procedures, or similar treatments.
41
 The services 
are too numerous to catalog in an insurance policy. A comprehensive list 
could run thousands of pages. Moreover, as scientific and medical 
knowledge advances, new services should be added, and perhaps currents 
ones dropped.
42
 Third, insurers are free to use their own formulas to 
calculate the actuarial value of their plans.
43
 This may encourage valuing 
costs or adding or omitting particular services within each EHB category to 
achieve the minimum actuarial value required for ACA plans. 
Finally, at the level of patient care, it is impossible to predict precisely 
what care should be covered (apart from routine preventive services and 
highly standardized therapies, such as setting a broken leg) until an 
 
41.  See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 34. Participants in employee group 
health plans are entitled to receive a summary plan description (although not the actual group 
health plan, which can be quite lengthy, unless requested) with descriptions similar to the 
HHS summary described. See Employee Income Security Retirement Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
1022, 1024. Employee benefit plans and summaries also generally describe benefits in 
categories, rather than particular services; and while details are sometimes provided for 
controversial conditions like infertility or items like durable medical equipment, services for 
general medical conditions, such as heart disease or rheumatoid arthritis, are rarely 
mentioned. Copies on file with author. See generally, Wendy K. Mariner, Business vs. 
Medical Ethics: Conflicting Standards for Managed Care, 23 J. L. Med. & Ethics 236, 241 
(1995); Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of Insurance to 
Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 Am. J. L & Med. 187 (1994); Mark 
A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Models of Rationing: Health Insurers’ Assessment of 
Medical Necessity, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1637 (1992). 
42.  See Alan M. Garber, Evidence-Based Coverage Policy, 20 Health Aff. 62, 79-80 
(2001) (providing that in practice, health insurers often rely on guidelines generated 
internally or based on medical specialty recommendations for best practices to determine 
what services are appropriate for particular medical conditions). 
43.  See 45 C.F.R. §156.135 (requiring HHS to provide an actuarial value (AV) 
calculator for insurers to calculate the actuarial value of their plans, but also allowing the use 
of alternative AV calculators subject to HHS requirements and state-specific standard 
populations subject to HHS approval). 
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individual actually needs care. What care is appropriate often depends on 
the medical condition and circumstances of the individual who seeks care. 
For example, even if liver transplantation is expressly listed as a covered 
service, it would be inappropriate for policyholders with medical 
contraindications to receive such a transplant. This means that what counts 
a covered benefit often cannot be specified ex ante in the policy when it is 
issued, but must be decided ex post if and when a person seeks care. 
The ex post nature of benefit coverage determinations suggests that 
policyholders typically will not know what services an ACA plan will cover 
unless there is consistency in interpreting EHB when people need health 
care. When disputes arise over coverage, consistency may be achieved only 
through the application of remedial principles, those that govern the 
interpretation of coverage. 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
The breadth and generality of EHB categories, enhanced by the 
“considerations” with which they should be balanced and fleshed out, offer 
a nearly blank canvas for benefit determinations. Still, it may be possible to 
add a little paint to the canvas by considering just how EHB coverage 
should be interpreted. 
The generality of EHB categories suggests that the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations may hold some promise as a rule of construction. 
The doctrine of reasonable expectations occupies a somewhat unsettled 
place in disputes over insurance coverage.
44
 Despite an impressive 
pedigree and acceptance by most insurance law scholars,
45
 it has not been 
 
44.  See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 
Harv. L. Rev. 961, 969-977 (1970) [hereinafter Keeton, Part One] (introducing the 
reasonable expectations principle); see also Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy 
Provisions: Part Two, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1285 (1970) [hereinafter Keeton, Part Two] 
(arguing that the reasonable expectations principle could fruitfully apply to the interpretation 
of warranties in insurance policies). 
45.  See Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law 
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 729, 729-732 (2000) (stating that a 
reasonable expectations analysis would help to assist “academic scholars, jurists, and 
insurance law practitioners alike” if the theory is interpreted properly); see also Robert H. 
Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 Conn. Ins. 
L.J. 21, 22-23 (1998) (discussing the history of the doctrine of reasonable expectations); 
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 107, 111, 150 (1998) 
[hereinafter Rahdert, Revisited] (describing four ways that the concept of reasonable 
expectations is used and rejecting criticisms of each use); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet 
Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the 
Misleading Mythology of the Judicial Role, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 181, 206-10 (1998) [hereinafter 
Stempel, Unmet Expectations] (discussing scholarly reactions to the reasonable expectations 
theory and noting that scholars support the doctrine more than do courts); Stephen J. Ware, A 
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defined or applied entirely consistently.
46
 Critics, including insurers, 
practitioners and some judges, have resisted its appeal.
47
 In contrast to 
more formal rules of contract construction, the doctrine calls for enforcing 
the policyholder’s objectively reasonable expectations even if the policy 
provisions negate such coverage.
48
 Some, though not all, of this 
divergence in opinion may stem from the assumption that the doctrine’s 
viability depends upon its relevance and application to all insurance 
disputes, or at least those in all lines of consumer insurance.
49
 
Professor (later Judge) Keeton formulated the principle of honoring 
 
Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1461, 1461 (1989) 
(stating that “[academic] commentary almost uniformly supports the reasonable expectations 
doctrine”); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 323, 
323-324 (1986) [hereinafter Rahdert, Reconsidered] (providing that the reasonable 
expectations doctrine was initially very popular with more than one hundred insurance cases 
in the court system referencing the doctrine, comprising nearly half of the states); Kenneth S. 
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable 
Expectations of the Insured, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1151, 1152-153 (1981) [hereinafter Abraham, 
Judge-Made Law] (discussing the history and application of the reasonable expectations 
principle). 
46.  Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law 
After Two Decades, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 823, 824 (1990); see Randy Maniloff & Jeffrey 
Stempel, The Reasonable Expectations Approach to Insurance Policy Interpretation, in 
General Liability Insurance: Key Issues in Every State (3rd ed. forthcoming 2015) 
(manuscript on file with author) (describing court decisions in all states that accepted and 
rejected the reasonable expectations doctrine or one of its variants); see also Abraham, 
Judge-Made Law, supra note 45, at 1153 (stating that the reasonable expectations principle 
is “not a monolithic one”, as it has been applied in a variety of circumstances, including 
“cases where the insured’s expectation of coverage was probably real and 
reasonable. . .where an expectation of coverage was less probable, but the policy’s denial of 
coverage seemed unfair. . .where an expectation of coverage was improbable and the denial 
of coverage would not appear unfair.”); Jeffrey E. Thomas, Reasonable Expectations 
Doctrine, 1-5 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE AND LAW PRACTICE §5.05[3] (2015) [hereinafter 
Thomas, Appleman on Insurance] (analyzing four approaches to the reasonable expectations 
doctrine); see also infra Part IV discussion. 
47.  See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 295, 300-301 (1998) [hereinafter Thomas, An 
Interdisciplinary Critique] (arguing that the doctrine is internally inconsistent); see also 
Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable Expectations after Thirty Years: A 
Failed Doctrine, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 425, 426, 432 (1998) (arguing that the doctrine lacked 
clear standards, was inconsistently applied, and raised insurance costs); Ware, A Critique of 
the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, supra note 45 at 1461-1462 (arguing that the doctrine 
should be abandoned, because the inequality of bargaining power and standard form 
contracts the doctrine purports to remedy can promote economic efficiency). 
48.  Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 45, at 183. 
49.  See James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations is Indispensable, If 
We Only Knew What For?, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 151, 152 (1998) [hereinafter Fischer, 
Reasonable Expectations] (discussing the value of the doctrine of reasonable expectations as 
a “methodology used to import ‘fairness’ into the loss distribution system” of insurance in 
general). 
Vol. 24 Annals of Health Law 448 
reasonable expectations to account for judicial decisions that favored an 
insurance policyholder despite policy language that appeared to exclude or 
limit coverage – decisions that could not be explained by existing 
interpretive rules.
50
 Policing doctrines, such as fraud, misrepresentation, 
concealment, duress, mistake, impracticability, and supervening frustration, 
did not apply in such decisions.
51
 Likewise, the decisions did not involve 
issues of warranty or estoppel.
52
 Professor Keeton’s goal was to offer a 




Professor Keeton stated his reasonable expectations principle as 
follows: “The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and 
intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be 
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have 
negated those expectations.”
54
 Keeton’s initial justification for the 
judiciary’s use of such a principle was the disadvantage placed on 
policyholders who must buy a standard form contract.
55
 Then, as now, 
“[i]nsurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion.”
56
  In such 
 
50.  Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 961-62. 
51.  See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts §§ 4.1 – 4.20 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing policing 
doctrines). 
52.  As used in practice, however, the reasonable expectations doctrine sometimes 
resembles principles of unconscionability and estoppel. Thomas, Appleman on Insurance, 
supra note 46; Jerry, supra note 45, at 36; see Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at 127–28 
(stating that “[t]he essential function of this facet of the reasonable expectations idea is to 
secure the basic fairness of policy terms and procedures). 
53.  See Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 961 (arguing that is possible to find some 
“currents of principle” in the decisions). 
54.  Id. at 967. The reasonable expectations principle was Keeton’s second principle. Id. 
at 961-62. Keeton’s first principle of unconscionable advantage has rarely been 
controversial, manifesting, as it does, a more general rule against enforcing unconscionable 
provisions in contracts in general: “An insurer will not be permitted an unconscionable 
advantage in an insurance transaction even though the policyholder or other person whose 
interests are affected has manifested fully informed consent.” Id. at 963; see Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (stating that a court may refuse to enforce a contract or a 
certain term that is found to be “unconscionable”). A third principle of detrimental reliance 
is uncontroversial and is of little relevance to the issues considered here. It provides: “A 
policyholder or other person intended to receive benefits under an insurance policy is 
entitled to redress against the insurer to the extent of detriment he suffers because he or 
another person justifiably relied upon an agent’s representation incidental to his employment 
for the insurer.” Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 977–78. 
55.  Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 966–67. For a seminal discussion of standard 
form contracts, see generally W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The 
Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 21 (1984). 
56.  Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 966; accord Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of 
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1176–77 (1983) (defining a 
contract of adhesion); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631–32 (1943) (using insurance contracts as 
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circumstances, Keeton argued, it is appropriate for courts to interpret or 
“regulate” insurance contract language “as laymen would understand it and 
not according to the interpretation of sophisticated underwriters.”
57
 
Although considered revolutionary in some respects, the doctrine could 
also be considered a fair adaptation of conventional rules of contract 
interpretation to insurance disputes.
58
 As Professor Jerry notes, the 
essence of a contract is a meeting of the minds, so that “the reasonable 
expectations of the parties are fundamental to the formation of a contractual 
obligation.”
59
 Where coverage disputes concerning standard form 
language in consumer policies arise, it makes some sense to consider the 
consumer’s reasonable expectations of coverage. 
The reasonable expectations doctrine gained notice during the 
1970s.
60
 It became generally accepted, if sparsely and inconsistently 
applied in practice, in the 1980s.
61
 Since then, the doctrine has suffered 
retrenchment, with some courts limiting its application to cases in which 
policy language was ambiguous and other courts rejecting it entirely.
62
 




key examples of contracts of adhesion). 
57.  Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 967; accord Kessler, supra note 56, at 637 (“In 
dealing with standardized contracts courts have to determine what the weaker contracting 
party could legitimately expect by way of services according to the enterpriser’s ‘calling,’ 
and to what extent the stronger party disappointed reasonable expectations based on the 
typical life situation.”). There exists understandable hesitation to apply the reasonable 
expectations doctrine to policies that have been carefully negotiated by so-called 
“sophisticated policyholders” who, unlike ordinary consumers, may have sufficient 
knowledge or bargaining power to negotiate a carefully tailored policy rather than accept a 
standard form policy. See Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540 F.2d 1257, 
1261 (5th Cir. 1976) (suggesting that the principle of construing ambiguous policy 
provisions against the drafter might not apply where the policy was negotiated by a 
“sophisticated” commercial company and the insurer who drafted the resulting policy). See 
generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Stempel on Insurance Contracts § 4.11 (2009) (describing the 
sophisticated policyholder concept and its application ); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the 
“Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 Drake L. Rev. 
807 (1993) (noting that courts have begun to recognize that some parties are more 
sophisticated than others). 
58.  See Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 142–45; see also Roger C. Henderson, The 
Formulation of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and the Influence of Forces Outside 
Insurance Law, 5 Conn. Ins. L.J. 69, 74 (1998) (noting that the doctrine was influenced by 
the § 211 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which addressed situations in which 
standard form contract terms can be ignored). 
59.  Jerry, supra note 45, at 29. 
60.  See Abraham, Judge-Made Law, supra note 45, at 1153; see also Stempel, Unmet 
Expectations, supra note 45, at 184; Jerry, supra note 45, at 22. 
61.  See Maniloff & Stempel, supra note 46 (forthcoming) (listing state by state rules). 
62.  Id. See generally Abraham, Distributing Risk, supra note 7 (explaining how public 
policy relates to interpretation of insurance contracts). 
63.  See, e.g., Fischer, Reasonable Expectations, supra note 49, at 172 (arguing that the 





 As a result, Keeton’s original 
principle has spawned several variations.
66
 Most prominent are a strong 
(pure) form and a weak form. The strong form follows Keeton’s original 
formulation, allowing the policyholder’s reasonable expectations to control, 
even though the policy’s text precludes coverage.
67
  The weak version 
differs little from the general principle of contra proferentem, which 
construes ambiguous contract language against the drafter.
68
 Indeed, it is 
questionable whether this weak version should be considered a variation on 
 
doctrine fails to offer meaningful criteria for determining reasonable expectations); Thomas, 
An Interdisciplinary Critique, supra note 47 (arguing that the doctrine fails to achieve its 
goals); Popik & Quackenbos, supra note 47 (arguing that the doctrine is plagued with 
problems like indefiniteness and unpredictability); Ware, supra note 45 (arguing for 
abandonment of the doctrine). 
64.  See, e.g., Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45 (defending the doctrine against 
critiques); Rahdert, Reconsidered, supra note 45 (updating his views of the importance of 
the reasonable expectations doctrine); Abraham, Judge-Made Law, supra  note 45 (analyzing 
applications of variations of the reasonable expectations doctrine). 
65.  See, e.g., Swisher, supra note 45 (discussing how the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations is a “‘middle ground’ synthesis of traditional, objective, and contractually based 
reasonable expectations principles”). 
66.  See Jerry & Richmond, supra note7, at 145-151 (describing the doctrine of 
reasonable expectations and its variations); see also Stempel, supra 45, at 192–93 
(describing seven court reactions: (1) strong or pure Keeton version; (2) construction in 
favor of insured where contrary text is hidden, surprising or contravenes the essence of the 
contract; (3) mandated coverage to accomplish the purpose of the policy; (4) estoppel against 
insurer because of insurer’s actions; (5) construction of ambiguous text in favor of insured’s 
expectations; (6) rejection of policyholder’s expectations; and (7) rejection of policyholder’s 
unreasonable expectations or expectations that contravene basic insurance principles, such as 
moral hazard, adverse selection or fortuity); Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at 115, 126, 
136, 140 (finding four applications of the doctrine in cases of (1) ambiguous policy 
language, (2) unconscionable policy provisions, (3) making the policy work for its intended 
purpose, and (4) protecting policyholders from catastrophic loss). 
67.  See Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 146 (describing the strong form of the 
reasonable expectations principle); see also Stempel, supra note 45, at 192 (explaining that 
this strong form the most favorable to policyholders). 
68.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981) (explaining that standard 
contract terms are construed against the drafter); see also Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, 
at 112 (explaining that the “ambiguity principle” invokes contra proferentem – a maxim that 
the courts apply to interpret ambiguous insurance policy language). This weaker form and 
variations that apply only in the presence of ambiguous language fit within traditional rules 
of contract interpretation. Id. Professor Jerry describes how noted scholars of contract 
foreshadowed the reasonable expectations doctrine. See Jerry, supra note 45, at 42-50. 
Among the antecedents Jerry cites are Kessler, supra note 56, Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of 
Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 Am. Econ. Rev. 665 (1925), SPENCER L. KIMBALL, 
INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: A STUDY IN THE LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC PUBLIC POLICY, BASED ON WISCONSIN RECORDS 1835-1959 (1960), and Alan 
Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in The Jurisprudential 
Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law (Jody S. Krauss & Stephen D. Walt, eds., 
1999). 
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the doctrine at all.
69
 
The scholarly debate produced limited consensus on how best to define 
and apply the doctrine.
70
 The twenty-first century has seen only a 
smattering of scholarly contributions that even relate to the idea of 
reasonable expectations.
71
 One possible reason for the continuing unease 
may be that scholars have not found consensus on a principle that can apply 
to all lines of insurance without disrupting the predictability of the meaning 
of contract terms. Universality, while desirable, is not a necessary quality 
for a principle of interpretation or construction. Some principles may fit 
only certain types of contracts. It is at least worth examining whether the 
doctrine does fit one particular context – health insurance policies that must 
cover the EHB required by the ACA. 
IV. DOES THE DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS SUIT 
 EX-POST INTERPRETATIONS OF ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS? 
Commercial health insurance policies occupy a somewhat unusual 
space among lines of insurance.
72
 They cross the boundary between 
conventional insurance and service contracts, because they cover both 
fortuitous losses, like accidental injuries and heart attacks, and predictable 
“losses,” such as preventive services.
73
 The ACA has pushed health 
insurance even farther away from the conventional insurance model and 
toward becoming a method of financing health care.
74
 Conventional rules 
of contract construction may be inadequate to interpret the terms of these 
new ACA health plans in light of the ACA’s requirement for coverage of 
 
69.  See Randall, supra note 6, at 109-110 (arguing that some courts apply contra 
proferentem, while characterizing it as a reasonable expectations approach). 
70.  See Fischer, supra note 49, at 153 (noting the doctrine’s “profound influence both in 
our conception of what insurance law is and how insurance law is implemented in the 
courts,” despite its adoption by only a minority of states). 
71.  See, e.g., Arthur J. Park, What to Reasonably Expect in the Coming Years from the 
Reasonable Expectations of the Insured Doctrine, 49 Willamette L. Rev. 165 (2012); W. 
David Slawson, Contractual Discretionary Power: A Law to Prevent Deceptive Contracting 
by Standard Form, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 853; David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra 
Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. Colo. L. Rev. 431 (2009); Dudi Schwartz, 
Interpretation and Disclosure in Insurance Contracts, 21 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 105 
(2008); Randall, supra note 6; Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer 
Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 Wash. 
L. Rev. 227 (2007); Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 139 (2005). 
72.  See Mariner, supra note 10, at 441-47 (discussing characteristics of health insurance 
before the ACA took effect). 
73.  See id. at 438. 
74.  See Mariner, supra note 10, at 196-201 (noting that the ACA eliminated most 
insurance techniques of risk selection and underwriting for health plans subject to ACA 
requirements). 
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EHB and its elimination of traditional methods of selecting and 
underwriting risks. 
ACA plans do have the characteristics of insurance policies that make 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations a potentially useful rule of 
construction. First, and most obviously, ACA plans are contracts of 
adhesion – standard form contracts for consumer insurance – the type of 
insurance contract that the doctrine of reasonable expectations fits best.
75
 
As Keeton noted, “the insured is left little choice beyond electing among 
standardized provisions offered to him, even when the standard forms are 
prescribed by public officials rather than insurers.”
76
 The standardized 
form may still offer some value to the extent that it provides uniform terms 
in compliance with ACA requirements and approved by state insurance 
regulators.
77
 However, insurers, rather than regulators, typically prepare 
the plan language, so terminology is not necessarily uniform.
78
 Moreover, 
as long as the Secretary and state regulators allow insurers to draft their 
own ACA plans, variation in policy language is likely to remain.
79
 In 
these circumstances, the ACA’s goal of ensuring a reasonably uniform 
package of benefits may not be attained without a reasonably uniform 
principle for interpreting EHB policy language. 
Second, ACA plans may be more “adhesive” than ordinary insurance 
policies, because individuals must buy a policy or face a penalty.
80
 Like 
consumers who purchase other types of insurance, purchasers of ACA plans 
have little bargaining power.
81
 However, this is not the typical take-it-or-
leave-it situation most consumers confront with standard form contracts. 
While ordinary insurance purchasers may have little or no choice of an 
automobile insurance policy, for example, they can refuse to buy a car (at 
least in theory) and thereby avoid having to buy insurance without losing 
any money. Persons obligated to obtain minimum coverage under the ACA 
 
75.  See Abraham, Policy Interpretation, supra note 7, at 540. 
76.  Keeton, Part One, supra note 44, at 966. 
77.  Where basic coverage terms are standard, consumers may be better able to compare 
other terms that may be important to them, such as premium rates, cost sharing, and 
participating providers. Standard forms have other recognized advantages, such as defining 
terms uniformly, reducing the transaction costs of negotiating individual agreements with 
numerous similarly situated individuals, and avoiding the need for individualized 
underwriting. See Slawson, supra note 55. The ongoing development of rules for web-based 
Summaries of Benefits and Coverage offers some promise here, although perhaps not 
enough to clarify EHB. See supra text accompanying notes 35–40. 
78.  This is not unique to health insurance, of course. See Keeton, Part One, supra note 
44, at 966–67. 
79.  See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. 
80.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2015). 
81.  See Schwarcz, supra note 40; see Daniel D. Barnhizer, supra note 71. 
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do not have that option
82
.  They must “take” a policy, because they cannot 
“leave it” without penalty. 
Third, those who purchase through a marketplace exchange have no one 
to bargain with. They log on to the state or federal website and choose from 
a list of plans.
83
 The information about plans on these websites is typically 
limited to a list of the general categories of covered benefits (e.g., 
emergency care, hospital care, maternity benefits), premiums, cost sharing 
amounts, some service limits, and perhaps a list of participating provider 
networks. The website may advise applicants to seek more information 
from each insurer, but insurer websites contain little more information than 
the exchange, suggesting that those who buy directly from an insurer are 
likely to learn no more than those who buy through an exchange 
marketplace. 
ACA plan purchasers have few, if any, sources of independent 
information about plan coverage.
84
 There is some evidence that 
independent insurance brokers offer limited advice about different plans, 
perhaps because brokers themselves know little more than what consumers 
find on websites or are not forthcoming with everything they do know.
85
 
Insurance regulators have not traditionally provided health insurance 
information directly to consumers.
86
 The ACA’s requirement for 
standardized Summaries of Benefits is a step in the right direction, but 
should not be expected to offer detailed coverage explanations. 
ACA plan purchasers typically cannot read a policy before buying it. 
Most policyholders never receive a copy of the policy at all, until after the 
contract has been made.
87
 Of course, few consumers read any insurance 




82.  Persons exempt from the minimum coverage requirement or penalty include 
undocumented aliens, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(d)(3); persons with certain religious objections, id. 
at § 5000(d)(2); prisoners, id. at § 5000A(d)(4), and persons below certain income 
thresholds, id. at § 5000A(e). 
83.  See, e.g., HealthCare.gov, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
www.healthcare.gov (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (federal); Access Health CT, www.ct.gov/ 
hix/site/default.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2015) (Connecticut); Get Covered Illinois, 
https://getcoveredillinois.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015 ) (Illinois); Kentucky’s Healthcare 
Connection, KYNECT, https://kynect.ky.gov/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015 ) (Kentucky). 
84.  See generally, Schwarcz, supra note 40 (arguing that the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau should encompass consumer protection in insurance markets). 
85.  See Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1263, 1267, 1322, 1329-1331 (2011) (presenting findings from a study of homeowners 
policies). 
86.  Id. at 1323–25. 
87.  Keeton, supra note 44, at 968; see Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque, supra note 39, 
at 421; Deborah Stone, Promises and Public Trust: Rethinking Insurance Law Through 
Stories, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1994). 
88.  See Rakoff, supra note 56, at 1179; Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: 
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Llewellyn famously called consumer consent to standard form contract 
terms a fiction.
89
 And consumers who do read a policy are likely to find it 
incomprehensible, despite recent efforts to prepare readable text.
90
 
Important details may be hard to find, such as coverage exclusions tucked 
into the definition of terms.
91
 Such textual vagaries give some courts 
reason to interpret insurance policy provisions to favor the policyholder. 
Fourth, and of special importance for ACA plans, the full policy rarely 
answers the questions a consumer may want or need to know. Some 
scholars have recommended more specific disclosure of plan terms to 
compensate for the disadvantages consumers face in purchasing almost any 
type of insurance.
92
 But disclosure of ACA plan terms is not enough. 
There is evidence that consumers have trouble understanding or using 
standard disclosures in many contexts.
93
 ACA plans present the more 
difficult problem that the plan itself cannot fully disclose everything that 
will (or will not) be covered. As noted above, the description of EHB 
categories is so broad and vague that, apart from a few dental and vision 
services, the policy itself cannot make explicit all covered benefits or 
exclusions. Thus, it is impossible to assume that had the consumer read the 
policy she would have recognized the limits of coverage. Furthermore, 
 
The Tested Language Defense, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1075, 1077 (2010); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 211 cmt. b. (1981) (“A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of 
agreement does not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the 
standard terms.”). 
89.  Karl. N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370 (1960). 
90.  See Schwarcz, supra note 85, at 1327; see generally Tesa Wilkinson-Ryan, A 
Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1745 (2014); Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (2003); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the 
Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 211, 213 (1995); see also Michael I. Meyerson, The 
Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 Ga. L. 
Rev. 583, 595 (1990). 
91.  Some versions of the reasonable expectations doctrine are applied where 
exclusionary language is found to be hidden, obscure, or misleadingly drafted. See Stempel, 
supra note 45, at 192; John Dwight Ingram, The Insured’s Expectations Should Be Honored 
Only If They Are Reasonable, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 813, 822 (1997). 
92.  See Rakoff, supra note 56; Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The 
Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in 
Standard Form Contracts, 31 Seattle U. L. Rev. 469, 512 (2008). See also, Melissa T. 
Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism – The Sliding Scale Approach to 
Unconscionability, 44 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1, 29–34 (2012) (describing literacy, lack of 
familiarity with the subject matter, time, psychological and other barriers that make actual 
consumer assent to standard form contract terms unrealistic). 
93.  See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure 14–31, 26–32, 69 (2014) (summarizing research finding that 
required disclosures are not necessarily read, understood or used by consumers to make 
decisions). 
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neither insurers nor regulators are likely to be able to compensate for the 
consumer’s lack of information at the time the policy is purchased, because 
they cannot predict ex ante an individual’s future needs. 
This brings us to the fifth and most significant reason why the 
reasonable expectations doctrine may suit ACA plan coverage decisions. 
Covered EHB in an ACA plan are necessarily determined ex post – when 
the consumer becomes a patient and seeks insurance coverage for health 
care. With inevitably vague EHB coverage terminology, decisions about 
what medical services the insurer will pay for necessarily arise only when 
the policyholder becomes a patient and seeks health care.
94
 At that point, 
the insurer and the patient each may have different ideas – or expectations – 
of what EHB coverage includes. 
These different ideas cannot be attributed to the policyholder failing to 
read the policy, or even misunderstanding its text.
95
 The difference is 
invited by the vague description of EHB coverage in the policy. 
Conventional contract interpretation rules cannot resolve the difference, 
because they do not address this problem. They simply do not fit. The 
rationale for enforcing the terms of a standard form contract that the 
policyholder merely failed to read is inapplicable here.
96
 The terms 
themselves could not specify what should be enforced. The principle that 
hidden terms should not be enforced against the policyholder is similarly 
inapplicable where specific terms are not hidden, because they are not 
included in the contract at all.
97
 The rule against enforcing unconscionable 
terms is similarly inapplicable.
98
 Most policing doctrines are not likely to 
apply to disputes over EHB coverage. Unless the insurer has led the 
policyholder to believe that a specific medical service would be covered, 
 
94.  There are, of course, important exceptions to this scenario. Some exclusions, such 
as custodial care or experimental therapies, may be clearly set forth in the policy, while 
others might be inferred from the text. Here, the focus is on the more common circumstance 
in which the determination must be made solely on the basis of what counts as part of EHB. 
95.  See Wendy K. Mariner, Can Consumer-Choice Plans Satisfy Patients? Problems 
with Theory and Practice in Health Insurance Contracts, 69 Brook. L. Rev. 485, 515–18 
(2004) (arguing that different rules may apply to ex ante purchases and ex post treatment 
decisions, because “consumers choose health plans, while patients choose medical care”). 
96.  See generally Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form 
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (2002); see generally W. David 
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 Harv. 
L. Rev. 529 (1971). 
97.  See Stempel, supra note 45, at 184–93 (describing judicial refusal to enforce 
coverage exclusions hidden in unexpected places in the contract or couched in unusual 
language, such that consumers would not necessarily notice them). 
98.  Keeton, supra note 44, at 963 (Keeton’s first principle forbids allowing insurers to 
take advantage of unconscionable provisions.). 
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fraud, misrepresentation, or estoppel is not likely to apply.
99
 The insurer is 




The rule that ambiguities in the policy should be construed against the 
drafter – the insurer – might seem to have a place here.
101
 However, EHB 
categories are not so much ambiguous as they are vague. There is a 
difference between ambiguity and vagueness.
102
 Ambiguous terms are 
subject to more than one objectively reasonable interpretation.
103
 Under 
the general contract rule, ambiguities are construed in favor of the 
policyholder’s expectations, especially where the policyholder was not in a 
position to know what the insurer meant.
104
 Strict application of such a 
rule to permit coverage of whatever a policyholder wants, however, can put 
insurers at an unfair disadvantage if the policyholder’s expectation is 
unreasonable.
105
 Moreover, such a strict application would not necessarily 
serve the purpose of an ACA plan.
106
 
The weak form of the reasonable expectations doctrine ameliorates this 
drawback somewhat by limiting coverage to what would be reasonable for 
policyholders to expect.
107
 However, even the weak form does not address 
 
99.  See generally Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies 
in Litigation with a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial 
Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, “MEND the Hold,” 
“FRAUD on the Court” and Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 589 
(1997–1998). 
100.  Exceptions might be found where the insurer and insured have an ongoing 
relationship, such as coverage of specific services for a chronic disease. See Stempel, 
Swisher, & Knutsen, supra note 8, at 129; see also Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and 
Default Rules, 3 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 43, 54–55 (1993); see generally John Aloysius Cogan 
Jr., Readability, Contracts of Recurring Use, and the Problem of Ex Post Judicial 
Governance of Health Insurance Policies, 15 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 93 (2010); see 
generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978). 
101.  See Stempel, supra note 45, at 206; see also Rahdert, Revisited, supra 45, at 116–
18; see also Abraham, Policy Interpretation, supra note 7, at 531 (“[I]nsurance policy 
provisions are in a sense always ambiguous.”); see also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy 
of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1712 (1997) (“No 
contract can fully and unequivocally address every question that may arise regarding its 
performance or nonperformance.”). 
102.  See Farnsworth, Contracts, supra note 51, at § 7.8 (distinguishing vagueness from 
ambiguity in contracts). 
103.  See Stempel Swisher & Knutsen, supra note 8, at 131. 
104.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201 (1981). 
105.  See Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why 
Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed against the Drafter, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 171, 189–
91 (1995); but see Horton, supra note 71, at 473 (arguing that strict liability contra 
proferentem “promotes uniformity of meaning in standard-form contracts”). 
106.  See infra Part V. 
107.  Most courts construe the rule to permit coverage only where coverage is an 
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the core problem in ACA plans. The problem is not that the insurer uses 
ambiguous terms, or even that the policyholder interprets those terms 
differently. Rather, the insurer cannot wholly describe the coverage and the 
policyholder cannot form concrete expectations. The problem is the vague 
nature of coverage. 
Vague terms present a more difficult problem than do ambiguous terms. 
Professor Farnsworth defined vague language as terms that are imprecise in 
marginal applications.
108
 However, EHB categories are vague in almost 
all their applications, not only in marginal ones. Indeed, EHB categories are 
so general as to be nearly meaningless.
109
 They offer only generic 
boundaries with little hint as to their specific content.
110
 Consider the 
EHB categories of ambulatory patient services, hospitalization, maternity 
and newborn care, and rehabilitative and habilitative services and 
devices.
111
 A policyholder can only learn exactly what illnesses, injuries, 
and therapies an insurer includes in these categories at the time – or shortly 
 
objectively reasonable expectation, considered in light of permissible extrinsic evidence. 
Stempel, Swisher & Knutsen, supra note 8, at 131; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 
(1981); Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at 116–17 (discussing the ambiguity rule in the 
context of insurance). 
108.  See E. Allan Farnsworth, ‘Meaning’ in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 
952–55 (1967) (identifying three types of imprecise contract language: vague terms; 
ambiguous terms; and ambiguous syntax); see also Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, at 126–
67. 
109.  See Stempel, supra note 45, at 264 (“Many insurance policy provisions, even those 
routinely enforced by courts, simply are not clear unless one understands the nature of the 
insurance product and the background of the specific contract.”). 
110.  See id. Four EHB categories have been somewhat more fully defined. Most 
specific are Federal regulations requiring coverage of preventive services recommended by 
the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force. See Recommendations for Primary Care Practice, 
U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE (Oct. 2014), http:// 
www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/recommendations. Some contraceptive 
services listed met with considerable controversy. See Exemption and Accommodations in 
Connection with Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013); 
see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). Mental health 
and substance use services are less well articulated in regulations. Many insurers have 
specified pharmaceutical formularies or tiers and pediatric oral and vision services. See 
generally state health insurance exchange websites: Regulations, CAL. HEALTH BENEFIT 
EXCH., http://hbex.coveredca.com/regulations/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2015); Summary of 
Benefits and Coverage (SBC), KY. HEALTH BENEFIT EXCH., 
http://healthbenefitexchange.ky.gov/Pages/Summary-of-Benefits-and-Coverage-(SBC).aspx 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2015); Rules & Regulations, MASS. HEALTH CONNECTOR, 
https://www.mahealthconnector.org/about/policy-center/rules-regulations (last visited Apr. 
15, 2015). 
111. Essential Health Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-health-benefits/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
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before – that service is sought.
112
 At that point, of course, the policyholder 




To be sure, many insurers include provisions stating that they will cover 
only medically accepted therapies that are recommended by a recognized 
medical specialty organization or Medicare guidelines, which gives a 
modicum of substance to the categories.
114
 However, the therapies 
themselves are not listed.
115
 More generally, insurers typically limit 
coverage to “medically necessary” or “appropriate” services and items.
116
 
While these terms add some limits to the general categories, the services 
that will be covered remain unspecified. Typically, the insurer reserves the 
contractual right to determine what is medically necessary in any individual 
case.
117
 Thus, coverage remains unpredictable ex ante by the policyholder 
and often also by the insurer. 
It would be the rare policyholder who is familiar enough with health 
insurance practices to be able to anticipate the range of healthcare services 
that will be covered. The ordinary consumer would have to possess a strong 
imagination to dream up the “losses” for which she seeks coverage ex ante. 
For the vast majority, no expectation of specific coverage arises until a 
physician or other health professional recommends a particular course of 
therapy. In today’s health plans, insurers “satisfy” claims by paying the 
provider, not the policyholder. The policyholder gets the services the 
insurer decides are covered ex post. 
 
112.  See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Patients’ Rights after Health Care Reform: Who 
Decides What Is Medically Necessary?, 84 Am. J. Pub. Health 1515 (1994). Some services 
may seem obvious, such as hospitalization for a stroke, but whether to give the patient tissue 
plasminogen activator (tPA), for example, depends upon the patient’s circumstances. See id. 
113.  See id. 
114.  See id. 
115.  See id. 
116. Alan M. Garber, Cost-Effectiveness and Evidence Evaluation as Criteria for 
Coverage Policy, 23 Health Aff. 284, 285 (2004); Harriette B. Fox & Margaret A. 
McManus, A National Study of Commercial Health Insurance and Medicaid Definitions of 
Medical Necessity: What Do They Mean for Children?, 1 Ambulatory Pediatrics 16 (2001); 
Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is Medically Necessary?, 
340 New Eng. J. Med. 229, 230 (1999); Mariner, supra note 112, at 1516–17. 
117.  See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 116, at 229–30. Similarly, health plans often 
require prior authorization of coverage for particular services for the purpose of determining 
whether particular services are medically necessary for an individual patient. For example, 
while a plan may indeed cover the category of behavioral health services, specific services, 
such as inpatient therapy, may not be covered and paid for without a plan determination that 
it is actually medically necessary. And ongoing utilization management practices may 
require periodic determinations that continued therapy is medically necessary. MAHP Letter 
to Massachusetts Division of Insurance re Special Session on Treatment for Opioid 
Addiction (Sept. 26, 2014) (on file with author). 
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Parties to ACA plans cannot realistically agree fully on EHB coverage 
ex ante, because of the unpredictability of any policyholder’s future medical 
needs and the impossibility of individualized negotiation of terms. In these 
circumstances, disputes over an ACA plan’s EHB coverage seem all but 
inevitable. The reasonable expectations doctrine seems well-suited to the 
task of interpretation, especially in its original strong form. This is because 
the strong form requires the policyholder’s expectations to be “objectively 
reasonable.”
118
 Insistence on an objective view of reasonableness makes 
sense where, at the time of purchase, the policyholder did not or could not 
anticipate what the plan might cover. In that case, when the policyholder 
needs care, she may “expect” coverage of the course of therapy that she and 
her physician now think best, regardless of cost.
119
 
The doctrine’s focus on expectations, however, may give us pause. If it 
is nearly impossible to form concrete expectations ex ante, how can one use 
the concept of reasonable expectations to determine coverage ex post?
120
 
A possible answer lies in focusing less on “expectations” and more on what 
is “reasonable.”
121
 The reasonable expectations doctrine, applied to 
disputes over coverage, could be understood to ask what an insurance 
policy of this particular sort should reasonably cover.
122
 But, one might 
object, isn’t this the same kind of question that arises with ordinary (non-
ACA) health insurance plans? After all, such plans typically describe 
coverage in generic categories, much like the EHB categories, and present 
problems of determining what that category includes. 
The difference between ACA plans and their predecessor commercial 
health insurance policies lies in the ACA’s requirements for coverage of all 
the EHB categories, which takes much of the discretion to select services 
 
118.  See Keeton, supra note 44, at 967; 
In our view, the reasonable-expectations doctrine does not automatically mandate 
either pro-insurer or pro-insured results. It does place a burden on insurance 
companies to communicate coverage and exclusions of policies accurately and 
clearly. It does require that expectations of coverage by the insured be reasonable 
under the circumstances. Neither of those requirements seems overly 
burdensome. Properly used, the doctrine will result in coverage in some cases and 
in no coverage in others. 
Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985). 
119.  See Ingram, supra note 91, at 826–32. 
120.  See Thomas, supra note 47, at 324–25 (noting that court conclusions about 
policyholder expectations are often a fiction); see also Rahdert, Revisited, supra note 45, at 
136. 
121.  See Fischer, supra note 49, at 163 (arguing that reasonableness may be used where 
the contract is silent “as to the level and degree of required specificity”). 
122.  See id. at 164–65 (arguing that courts claiming to honor the policyholder’s 
expectations are actually interpreting the contract to serve its social policy purpose). 
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and impose limits out of the insurer’s hands.
123
 Moreover, the insurer is 
not free to select risks for ACA plans, but must ensure balanced coverage 
under the “considerations,” all while keeping premiums affordable.
124
 
Thus, what might be reasonable for a pre-ACA health insurance policy may 
not be reasonable for an ACA plan. 
The ACA alters the expectations of both insurer and insured. In the 
context of ACA plans, the doctrine could ask what therapy or service an 
ACA plan should reasonably be expected to cover in light of the ACA’s 
goal of ensuring that ACA plans cover a comprehensive set of benefits – 
EHB – for a premium that is affordable to the population required to obtain 
coverage. 
V. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF ACA PLANS AND RULES OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
The ACA creates legislative expectations for ACA plans. These can be 
easily inferred from the statutory requirements for ACA plan coverage 
(including EHB), guaranteed issue and renewal, no dollar caps on coverage, 
nondiscrimination on the basis of health factors, actuarial values, medical 
loss ratios, risk adjustments, and reinsurance, to name only a few.
125
 ACA 
plans are almost entirely creatures of the federal statute.
126
 This suggests 
that a fair interpretation of ACA plan terms necessarily depends on 
understanding – and interpreting – the statutory provisions governing ACA 
plans. 
Rules of statutory interpretation are likely to be necessary in 
considering how EHB coverage should be construed.
127
 Professor Stempel 
compares the function of standard form insurance policies to that of 
legislation, arguing that canons of statutory construction could prove useful 
 
123.  Mariner, supra note 10, at 439–40. 
124.  NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, ADVERSE SELECTION ISSUES AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE EXCHANGES UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 2–4 (2011), available at 
http://www.naic.org/store/free/ASE-OP.pdf. 
125.  See supra notes 17–18. 
126.  Id. 
127.  For general treatments of statutory analysis, see Frank B. Cross, The Theory and 
Practice of Statutory Interpretation (2009); William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., Cases and 
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 
2010); Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory 
Construction (2007); Peter L. Strauss, Legislation: Understanding and Using Statutes (2006); 
William D. Popkin, Statutes in Court: The History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation 
(1999); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 
65 Stan. L. Rev. 901, 965 (2013) (finding that legislative staff viewed legislative history as 
second only to statutory text as the most important tool for interpreting legislation). 
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in interpreting policy content.
128
 Professor Randall argues that state 
“statutory and regulatory control of insurance relationships should displace 
judicial reliance on contract principles.”
129
 ACA plans are not merely 
analogous to statutes; their design and marketing are almost entirely 
governed by legislation and implementing regulations. Federal law 
dominates the regulatory framework for ACA plans, despite preservation of 
many state insurance licensure and rate-setting functions.
130
 Indeed, the 
scope of federal requirements make ACA plans look rather like part of a 
more traditional federal benefit program, such as Medicare Part B, 
administered by third party insurers.
131
 
To properly construe the purpose, function, and terms of an ACA plan, 
it may be impossible to avoid interpreting the statute itself. As Professor 
Randall suggests, this shifts the starting point for interpretation from 
contract to statutory rules of construction.
132
 If, as argued above, specific 
benefits covered by EHB cannot be discerned from the plan text and the 
parties have no ex ante specific intent respecting particular benefits 
coverage, then contract-based rules of construction offer little guidance. 
While the doctrine of reasonable expectations suggests searching for what 
would be reasonable for a health plan of this type, it begs the question of 
what counts as reasonable in such a plan. If one adds – or begins with – the 
presumption that ACA plans are intended to function as means of financing 
affordable health care, then courts may be able to resolve disputes by 
focusing on the purpose that ACA plans are to serve.
133
 
The ACA can be seen as a remedial statute – one enacted to remedy the 
market failures that made health insurance unaffordable or unavailable to 
more than eighteen percent of the population in 2010.
134
 ACA remedial 
 
128.  See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 McGeorge L. Rev. 
203, 215 (2010) [hereinafter Stempel Insurance Policy]. 
129.  Randall, supra note 6, at 107; see also James Davey, Fracturing and Bundling 
Risks: The Coverage Expectations of the “Real” Reasonable Policyholder, 11 Rutgers J.L. 
& Pub. Pol’y 118, 135–38 (2013) (discussing an English case in which the court aligned 
contract interpretation with statutory interpretation). 
130.  See Randall, supra note 6, at 126–36. (for a summary of the variation in often 
limited regulatory authority of state insurance departments even before the ACA). 
131.  See BARBARA S. KLEES ET AL., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID 11–13 
(Nov. 1, 2014) (for a description of Medicare Part B, which combines federal payments with 
beneficiary premium payments). 
132.  See Randall, supra note 6, at 108, 135–36. This suggests a question beyond the 
scope of this article: whether ACA plans should be considered to be contracts of adhesion to 
the extent that the statute and regulations serve to represent the interests of the consumer. 
133.  See Stempel, supra note 128, at 230 (“Particular applications of the policy to 
unanticipated future disputes may not have been foreseen, but the general goals of the policy 
provisions are ascertainable with reasonable certainty.”); Robert Katzmann, Judging Statutes 
31–34 (2014). 
134.  See generally Inst. of Med., America’s Uninsured Crisis: Consequences for Health 
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provisions eliminate most of the prerogatives heretofore enjoyed by 
individual and small group health insurance carriers under state statutes and 
common law.
135
 The maxim that remedial statutes should be liberally 
construed seems particularly relevant here.
136
 This rule argues against 
relying solely on contract rules of construction, particularly those that are 
limited to the text of an insurance policy’s coverage provisions, and in favor 
of interpreting ACA plan coverage in light of legislative intent or goals. 
Arguably, then, the ACA’s requirement for EHB coverage should be 
liberally construed. At the same time, the ACA goal of affordability argues 
against a construction so liberal that it would jeopardize the solvency of the 
health insurance industry. 
Some might argue that the ACA could be considered a statute in 
derogation of the common law. Such statutes were traditionally construed 
narrowly,
137
 but that rule may hold little sway today.
138
 ACA provisions 
governing insurance do not expressly abrogate common law rules for 
interpreting insurance policies. Yet, the ACA does impose federal rules on 
activities – designing, pricing, and selling health insurance policies – that 
were already regulated in part at both the state and federal level.
139
 The 
more persuasive view of the ACA is a remedial statute that expands federal 
regulation to remedy the market failures remaining under pre-existing laws. 
 
and Health Care (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/ 
Report%20Files/2009/Americas-Uninsured-Crisis-Consequences-for-Health-and-Health-
Care/Americas%20Uninsured%20Crisis%202009%20Report%20Brief.pdf; see PAUL 
FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS 
OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 7 (Sept. 
2011), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2011_No362_ 
Uninsured1.pdf (for data on the numbers of uninsured in 2010). 
135.  Mariner, supra note 10, at 439–40. 
136.  See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 Geo. 
L.J. 341, 402, (2010) (concluding that nineteen states have codified this rule as a method of 
interpreting their state statutes). 
137.  See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383, 386 
(1908). 
138.  See Scott, supra note 136, at 402 (finding that twenty states rejected the rule that 
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed); see also Pound, 
supra note 137, at 387 (arguing that the principle that statutes in derogation of the common 
law should be strictly construed was already an anachronism in 1908, because “no statute of 
any consequence dealing with any relation of private law can be anything but in derogation 
of the common law”). 
139.  See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 (West, 
WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-235, 113-287, and 113-291); Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.); Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 (West, WestlawNext through P.L. 113-296 (excluding P.L. 113-
235, 113-287, and 113-291); Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 & 42 U.S.C.). 
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Assuming that the ACA is a remedial statute, however, does not 
automatically answer the question of how EHB should be construed. What 
exactly should be construed expansively? One might argue that EHB 
categories should be construed expansively to permit coverage of most, if 
not all, services that fall within the category. But that would have the same 
disadvantages that construing coverage to favor the policyholder’s 
expectations would have, especially if expectations are not limited to 
objectively reasonable expectations. 
Here, the canons of statutory construction may help. The text of the 
EHB section of the ACA is too vague to offer a plain meaning for designing 
coverage or making individual patient care determinations.
140
 Although 
the EHB requirements are not precisely ambiguous in the sense used in 
interpreting insurance policies, they should qualify as ambiguous for 
purposes of statutory interpretation and therefore be subject to the more 
contextual rules of construction, legislative intent in particular.
141
 
The meaning of EHB appears to depend importantly on its context – the 
overall goal and function of the ACA.
142
 Recall that the ACA’s goal is 
twofold: to expand access to care by enabling individuals to obtain health 
insurance coverage, and to keep premiums affordable.
143
 One cannot read 
the statute itself or the limited legislative history without recognizing both 
objectives. Thus, the ACA itself incorporates the tension inherent in many 
insurance relationships between the policyholder’s desire for coverage and 
the insurer’s desire (or need) to limit expenditures. But the ACA does not 
lean to one or the other. By making both objectives clear, the ACA 
 
140.  See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172 (2001) (to find the meaning of a statute, 
the court begins with its language). 
141.  See Katzmann, supra note 133, at 35; Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Common 
Law Interpretation 140 (2013) (there is “no neat categorization” or hierarchy of factors that 
apply to statutory interpretation of ambiguous terms). They may also be subject to 
interpretation by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury, the 
federal agencies charged with issuing regulations to implement the ACA. See Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–844 (1984). 
142.  See Bond v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (2014) (“Part of a fair reading of statutory 
text is recognizing that ‘Congress legislates against the backdrop’ of certain unexpressed 
presumptions,” citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)); Nat’l Ass’n 
of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007) (words may become 
meaningful only when read in context); Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000) (“A court must . . . interpret the statute as a 
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious 
whole.”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 9 (1994) 
(discussing dynamic statutory interpretation, which accepts that meaning often only becomes 
clear when applied to “concrete circumstances”). 
143.  MORGAN DOWNEY & CHRISTOPHER D. STILL, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S 
IMPACT ON PERSONS WITH OBESITY 2 (2013), available at http:// 
www.downeyobesityreport.com/wp-content/uploads/The-Affordable-Care-Act2.pdf. 
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recognizes – indeed, requires – balancing the scope of coverage with its 
cost. This suggests that within EHB categories, insurers must cover 
necessary and medically acceptable services (and providers), but need not 
include expensive services where safe and effective alternatives are less 
costly. 
One might be concerned that courts today could be reluctant to engage 
in this type of functional analysis.
144
 Both the reasonable expectations 
doctrine and the statutory intent canon fall on the functional side of rules of 
interpretation.
145
 That is, each interprets the meaning of policy and 
statutory language, respectively, in light of its function and purpose, rather 
than relying on the text alone (unless the text is ambiguous or unclear).
146
 
But reliance on text alone is not likely to resolve disputes over the meaning 
of EHB coverage, at least in most cases. Thus, a rule based on function or 
purpose seems inevitable. The idea that ACA plans serve a remedial 
statutory function only reinforces this conclusion. 
Resistance to the rule of function comes most often from scholars and 
courts that prefer the formal approach to contract interpretation credited to 
Professor Williston.
147
 This approach resists consideration of any extrinsic 
evidence outside the “four corners” of the contract unless the text is 
unclear.
148
 The text is presumed to state the parties’ intention, so that the 
“plain meaning” of the text must be enforced.
149
 Courts in the majority of 
jurisdictions view themselves as bound by their role as interpreters to avoid 
making judgments that could be considered rewriting the contract between 
the parties.
150
 Judges who are uncomfortable trying to interpret a contract 
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conceptions of textualism); Richard A. Posner, Reflections on Judging 178–235 (2013) 
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146.  Fischer, supra note 49, at 180 (The doctrine of reasonable expectations “needs to 
shed its disguise of policyholder expectations and sustain itself on its true grounding of 
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public policy.”). 
147.  Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (1961); see Swisher, supra 
note 145, at 1047 (comparing formalist and functionalist approaches to interpreting 
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148.  See Randall, supra note 6, at 110–11. 
149.  See Restatement (First) of Contracts (1932) (presenting the formal rule of 
construction); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(3) (1981) (reflecting a somewhat 
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465 The Picture Begins to Assert Itself 2015 
without hanging their hat on a contract term may fall back on limiting their 
analysis to the text of the contract.
151
 The rule also supports predictability 
in judicial decisions; if the contract’s text is clear, it will be enforced 
without resort to other evidence.
152
 Such predictability can save an insurer 




However, the formal rule does not work for EHB disputes. To the 
extent that enforcing clear policy language is intended to encourage the 
parties to expressly agree on their specific intended bargain, the parties to 
ACA plans simply cannot comply. They do not bargain together, and they 
cannot adequately specify what they expect from coverage in advance. 
There is not always a plain meaning. Acceptance of formal interpretation 
rules only exacerbates the disadvantages of standard form contracts while 
offering few, if any, of its advantages. While formal policy interpretation 
may lessen the burden of judges and insurers, it is not a credible method of 
identifying the intent of the parties in ACA plans.
154
 As Professor Fischer 
argues, “If reading the policy is essentially useless, it is difficult to support 
use of policy structure or language complexity as a basis for determining 
reasonable expectations, or any expectations for that matter.”
155
 
Professor Stempel argues that the judiciary has little reason to revere 
the idea of judicial restraint when interpreting any type of insurance 
policy.
156
 There is even less reason to do so in the case of ACA plans. 
Most obviously, the meaning of contract terms is a matter of law for the 
court to decide.
157
 The terms of ACA plans must also meet statutory 
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Policy, supra note 128, at 230–31 (purpose-oriented methods of analysis are only a short 
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1997); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. d (1981). 
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requirements, and statutory interpretation is also a matter for the judiciary. 
Basing decisions solely on the text of an ACA plan is to pretend to find the 
meaning of words without admitting the pretense.
158
 Since ACA plan 
provisions on EHB are likely to offer only general descriptions, courts have 
little choice but to interpret their terms in light of the statutory purpose that 
such plans are intended to implement. To do otherwise risks overstepping 
the boundary between Congress and the judiciary. 
Furthermore, ex post EHB coverage determinations are individualized 
decisions, where there is less pressure for the application of a uniform rule. 
The issue is whether an insurer is bound to pay for a particular course of 
therapy for one individual, not a search for the plain meaning of a text 
applicable to all policyholders. What may be reasonable and necessary for 
one patient may not be for another, and decision-making takes place in the 
context of limited resources. Courts could consider the cost to the insurer of 
covering that therapy for the proportion of policyholders who are predicted 
to need it and compare that cost with premiums. Surely insurers could 
provide some actuarial support for the assumptions underlying the premium 
rate. Insurers should be expected to pay for what the policyholder 
reasonably needs and nothing more, in order to ensure the availability of 
funds to cover every policyholder’s reasonable needs.
159
 In essence, 
interpreting EHB coverage in individual cases is analogous to deciding 
whether the insurer is acting in good faith, a doctrine that courts have few 
qualms applying, despite its independence from the text of a contract.
160
 
To be sure, the judicial task of dispute resolution under this analytic 
framework may be complex.
161
 Nonetheless, it may be more honest and 
acceptable to all parties than attempts to force ACA plan generalities into 
ill-fitting contract rules of construction. Courts need not resort to fictions 
like the intent of the parties or ambiguous text, but can focus on identifying 
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Moreover, to the extent that insurers and consumers gain experience with 
the scope and limits of ACA plan coverage and affordability, regulatory 
agencies should be able to develop more detailed rules or guidance for 
specific types of EHB categories, as the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services have done for Medicare benefits.
163
 
It may not matter whether one characterizes this approach as a 
reasonableness standard or as statutory interpretation.
164
 In the case of 
ACA plans, they are two sides of the same coin.
165
 The approach might be 
called reasonable statutory expectations. The reasonable expectations of the 
parties cannot diverge significantly from Congressional intent, because all 
parties are bound by the statutory framework. Moreover, the ACA itself 
probably inspires its own expectations among insureds and insurers. Thus, 
the rule of construction should ask what services a reasonable health plan 
would cover to comply with the EHB requirements in light of ACA’s goal 
of comprehensive and affordable coverage. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A functional approach to ACA plan interpretation could move us 
farther down the path to a more “carefully calculated” picture of ACA plan 
coverage. Since the ACA has altered the concept of insurance in the context 
of health insurance, it stands to reason that insurance law applied to ACA 
plans should adapt itself to the ends that the ACA seeks to achieve. 
Traditional rules of construction for insurance policies do not easily fit the 
individualized determinations of health services covered as part of EHB. 
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Without explicit, individualized content in the definition of EHB, the 
language of the plan itself can offer no text, ambiguous or otherwise, on 
which courts might pin their decisions. In the absence of specific ex ante 
expectations about particular health services for a particular person, 
coverage determinations cannot rely on the intent of the parties or their 
expectations. 
Yet the purpose of ACA plans is clear. They should provide reasonably 
necessary care at an affordable price. This two-part goal offers a framework 
for a functional analysis of EHB – reasonable statutory expectations. 
Decision-makers, both insurers and courts, would be well served by 
beginning an analysis of EHB coverage that is consistent with the ACA’s 
two-part goal. In so doing, decision-makers can apply well-established rules 
of statutory construction, which necessarily apply to health plans that are 
created and governed by federal law. Where such rules do not resolve 
conflicting interpretations, decision-makers can look to what can be 
reasonably expected of a comprehensive, but affordable, ACA plan. 
This is a modest conclusion, one that does not pretend to solve all 
controversies over ACA plans, much less other insurance policy 
interpretations. It addresses only the interpretation of EHB in ACA plans 
marketed to individuals and small groups. Thus, it does not challenge the 
coverage exclusions permitted by the ACA, for example.
166
 Neither does 
it address plans governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
nor any public benefit programs such as Medicare or Medicaid. Moreover, 
it may not affect ACA plans that include mandatory arbitration provisions, 
although arbitrators could – and, I would argue, should – apply the same 
principles in their proceedings.
167
 It could be used in both internal and 
external review processes for claims determinations. 
The proportion of the population currently enrolled in ACA plans is 
small—less than five percent of eligible individuals.
168
 Nevertheless, the 
symbolic value of ACA plans far exceeds the number of people they enroll. 
And, barring a collapse of federal tax credits, that number may grow over 
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time.
169
 ACA plans are an essential piece of the picture of health benefits 
for all Americans. 
A functional approach to interpreting ACA plans may move us toward 
a more realistic view of health insurance in general. It may also move 
insurance law toward a more principled conception of highly regulated 
insurance policies.
170
 At the very least, a rule of construction based on the 
legislative purpose of ACA plans is a step toward achieving fairness both 
across populations and in individual cases. Decisions that are consistent 
with ACA goals may foster trust among consumers and patients that their 
health insurance is serving their most basic needs, even if it does not pay for 
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